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iEsa India! LatCrit Theory and the Place of
Indigenous Peoples Within Latina/o
Communities
SIEGFRIED WIESSNER*
I. THE PROMISE OF A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
LatCrit, as I understand it, stands in a great tradition. With Ameri-
can Legal Realism, it shares the focus on the empirical rather than the
normative. Transcending, however, the Realist emphasis on analysis,
and harnessing the sensitivities of the outsider, the LatCrit movement
has formed around a powerful policy objective: the goal of overcoming
structures of oppression and patterns of injustice encountered by
Latinas/os in the United States and beyond.
LatCrit theory is, as Frank Valdes has explained, "embryonic."' It
attempts to produce critical knowledge, create material social change,
and build coalitions as well as scholarly community. Beyond those
activities, LatCrit is "a project perpetually under construction, but one
whose construction . . . seems consciously guided by a progressive,
inclusive and self-critical theory about the purpose and experience of
theory."2 As a postmodern theory, LatCrit focuses on education,3 illu-
minating the limitations of an exclusively rights-based approach to
resolving problems of group-wide oppression and discrimination.4 As a
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D. (Equivalent), University of
Tubingen, 1977; LL.M., Yale University, 1983; Dr. iur., University of Tibingen, 1989.
1. See Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1997).
2. Id. at 1096.
3. Key elements of this strategy are the twin goals of empowering individual human beings
via education and encouraging them to act as agents for social change. See PAULO FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
4. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) launched a more fundamental assault on "rights rhetoric." It
argues that rights perpetuate patterns of societal subordination by, inter alia, maintaining
"collective passivity." Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN L. REV. 1,
36 (1984). See also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 63 (1987) ("Rules are
the opiate of the masses"); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984);
and Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). Another reason for the critique of "rights" is their perceived
indeterminacy. Cf. Man Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 328 (1987) ("Rights are whatever people in power say they
are.") In addition, proponents of feminist jurisprudence have identified a focus on "rights," even
as a means to overcome social injustice, as overly aggressive, male, litigious. See, e.g., MARY
AnN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991).
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post-postmodern movement, it reveals inklings of cultural essentialism
in its difficult quest for identity,5 the fight for language rights,6 and the
affirmation of distinct expressions of culture.7
Appropriately, LatCrit joins critical race theories in their skepticism
of a wholesale rejection of the rights discourse8 and the power processes
5. The definition of Latina/o identity is complicated by the multiple affiliations and
identifications of the individual person sought to be encompassed. See Leslie G. Espinoza,
Latinalo Identity and Multi-Identity, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER 17-23
(Richard Delgado et al. eds., 1998). For local flavor, see Andra D.S. Burch & Lydia Martin,
Defining Who We Are In S. Florida Isn't Just a Black and White Issue, THE MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
7, 1998, at IA, 6A.
Frank Valdes uses the term "Latina/o" "generally to signify persons with nationalities or
ancestries derived from countries with 'Hispanic' cultures; currently in the United States, these
persons or groups are primarily (but not exclusively) Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and
Cubans or Cuban-Americans." Valdes, supra note 1, at 1090 n.6. This working definition still
leaves us with the question of what, exactly, "Hispanic cultures" are. As Valdes points out,
Latina/o communities are characterized by a "high degree of mestizaje, or racial intermixture." Id.
at 1106. In celebrating this substantive, multicultural condition, Margaret Montoya calls for the
"pursuit of mestizaje, with its emphasis on our histories, our ancestries, and our past experiences,
... [because it] can give us renewed appreciation for who we are as well as a clearer sense of who
we can become." Margaret E. Montoya, Masks and Identity, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER 37, 42 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 1998).
6. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1366
(1997), ("To suppress the speaking of Spanish is to suppress an essential, if not the essential,
component of Latino identity"); see also Montoya, supra note 5, at 41 (Montoya's sensitive
statement on the relevancy of language, syntax, and accent to identity: "Aqui estoy ocultada por
mi miscara linguistica con sus aspectos subtextuales. Desde nifia, he entendido el significado de
accentos, vocabulario, pronunciaci6n, sintaxis. En ingls estos elementos idiomiticos estin
relacionados con mi psique, con la persona quidn soy. Por la primera vez entiendo que espafiol
tiene el mismo poder"); Juan F. Perea, Death by English, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER, 583 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 1998); Margaret E. Montoya, Law and
Language(s), in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER, 574 (Richard Delgado et al. eds.,
1998).
7. See Angel R. Oquendo, Re-imagining the Latino/a Race, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER, 60, 70 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 1998). See also ILAN STAVANS, THE
HISPANIC CONDITION: REFLECTIONS ON CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA (1995); RENATO
ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1989); Felix M. Padilla, On
the Nature of Latino Ethnicity, 65 Soc. Sci. Q. 651, 662 (1984). Also, the humanities discussion
of the integrative function of music and dance in Latina/o communities might be apposite in this
context.
8. For an insightful critique of pertinent CLS theories and theorists, see Richard Delgado,
The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Need?, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987).
According to classical "liberal" theory (another article needs to be written about the gusto
with which both the left and the right attack their common foe, albeit differently defined, i.e.
"liberalism"), the empowerment of individuals through the legal system has been effectuated, over
time, through the accordance of certain legally protected claims called "rights." Recently, this
focus has come under fire. See discussion supra note 4. However, shared concepts of legal
"rights" and their enforcement in authoritative and controlling decision-making structures have
been, and continue to be, critical to the protection of vulnerable groups. Thus, rights are
necessary, albeit hardly sufficient. See Siegfried Wiessner, Faces of Vulnerability: Protecting
[Vol. 53:831
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of the state as useful instruments to establish a public and private order
that approximates the proper respect for equal status and dignity of all
human beings. In that quest, LatCrit theory can only gain from consider-
ing the contributions of a theory about law that has been termed the
"jurisprudence for a free society"9 - a most helpful, interdisciplinary
approach that analyzes and resolves societal problems and finds its guid-
ing light in the overarching goal of a universal order of human dignity.
Lamentably, Professor Myres Smith McDougal, this theory's main
protagonist, died yesterday morning.' 0 In Eugene Rostow's words, "A
mighty oak has fallen and the forest will never be the same."" His
intellectual legacy, however, will go on. And what a tremendous legacy
he has left us. Professor McDougal has revolutionized the way we view
law. Law, for him, had a purpose: it was to maintain minimum order,
12
and on that basis, to construct an optimum public order of human dig-
Individuals in Organic and Non-Organic Groups, in THE LIVING LAW OF NATIONS 217, 222
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Peter MacAlister-Smith eds., 1996). They are, if not prerequisites, at
least useful tools in the realization of other "ideas of the good" such as a global (minimum) ethic,
cf JA ZUM WELTETHOS, PERSPEKTIVEN FOR DIE SUCHE NACH ORIENTIERUNG (Hans King ed.,
1995), some basic mandates of religion or the concept of development, cf L. HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 186-87, 191-93 (1990) even Joseph Singer's social vision of "nihilism" in its quest for the
prevention of cruelty, alleviation of misery, and democratization of illegitimate hierarchies, cf.
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1
(1984), the tenets of natural law, or the goals of a world public order of human dignity as
suggested here. The indeterminacy critique does not relieve us from responsibility for our acts of
interpretation, i.e., participation in the process of making and changing decisions. See Drucilla
Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal
Interpretation, II CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1714 (1990) ("Interpretation is transformation, and we
are responsible as we interpret for the direction of that transformation. We cannot escape our
responsibility implicit in every act of interpretation.").
9. The summa of the approach presented here is to be found in HAROLD D. LASSWELL &
MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY (1992). It has been developed and applied in a wide variety of contexts. Key statements
of the approach, interchangeably called the "New Haven School of Jurisprudence," "law, science
and policy," or "policy-oriented jurisprudence," are to be found in the classic articles: Myres S.
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal,
Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 486 (1966-67); Myres S.
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362
(1971); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories about
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968). For
the location of Myres McDougal's ideas in the universe of jurisprudence, see William L.
Morrison, Myres S. McDougal and Twentieth-Century Jurisprudence: A Comparative Essay, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. McDOUGAL 3
(W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976).
10. The lecture was presented on May 8, 1998, the day after Professor McDougal passed
away.
11. 45 YALE L. REP. No. 2, at 16 (Summer 1998).
12. Myres S. McDougal & Siegfried Wiessner, Law and Minimum World Public Order, in
MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR XiX
(1994).
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nity. 13 Empirically speaking, he considered law the outcome of a pro-
cess of making decisions, vested with both authority and the attendant
threat of sanctions in case of non-compliance, which he called "control
intent." Professor McDougal urged every participant in this process,
from scholars, to legislators, to lawyers, to judges, and others, to clarify
their "observational standpoint:" "Where do you locate yourself vis- -
vis the problem at hand?" Such standpoint varies, depending upon fac-
tors such as one's life experiences, education, family background, and
whether one is a member of the dominant social group or an outsider on
the margin. It may differ according to important aspects of our identity
such as race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, and so forth.
This observational standpoint also may change over time. " We all have
different experiences in life, even though we share some with other
members of particular groups. What Professor McDougal has taught us
is how to be both cautious and introspective; to find out where we are
coming from, what makes us tick, what our background is; and to put
our particular perception of a problem and its solution into the perspec-
tive of our own critically reviewed experience. Thus, the call of policy-
oriented jurisprudence to "clarify our observational standpoint," issued
many years ago, 15 is a proper approach for critical race theorists com-
mitted to the discipline of self-reflection and self-critique, 6 as well as to
the insights of intersectionality, multiplicity, and multidimensionality. 7
It also evokes Pierre Schlag's problematization of the "subject"' 8 and
Robert Chang's call for elucidation of the "subject position,"' 9 i.e.,
13. W. Michael Reisman, Myres Smith McDougal Remembered, 45 YALE L. REP. No. 2, at
14, 15 (Summer 1998).
14. Individual and group identity influence and modify each other in social interaction. As an
individual human being's identity develops in constant interplay between the individual and
society's constituent groups, starting with the basic relationship between parents and children, not
only is the individual self shaped and changed, but general patterns of group behavior are
reconstructed and modified as well. See GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY:
FROM THE STANDPOIrrr OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORALIST (C. Morris ed., 1934); Wiessner, supra note
8, at 218-19 (providing further references).
15. E.g., Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L.
REv. 486, at 501 (1966-67).
16. See Francisco Valdes, supra note 1, at 1140 (stressing the "need for continual self-
reflection, self-examination, and self-critique").
17. Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Berta Esperanza
Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric
and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994); Espinoza, supra note 5.
18. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991); see also
J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal
Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993).
19. See Robert S. Chang, The End of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the Essential
Subject, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687 (1996).
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determination of the stance of the author vis-A-vis the topic addressed.
Professor McDougal also insisted that, in fashioning a solution to a
particular social problem, we should not, a priori, limit the variables that
constitute and impact the issue at hand to one text (of a law or judgment
or other prior decision) or consider only a few cloistered societal fac-
tors.2" Instead, he counseled that we should include all of the factors
relevant to legal decisionmaking regarding the problem under considera-
tion. Underlying this approach is a broader, empirical conception of law
that views law not merely as a body of rules, but as a continuous process
of decisions made by persons vested with authority and backed up by the
threat of sanctions.2" This co-presence of authority and control intent is
essential, because naked power, absent authority, is not enough to vest a
decision with the mantle of law. Also, morality, even at the vaunted
level of "natural" law, is not self-enforcing. Thus, we need the power
processes of established communities to help morality, or certain value
or policy preferences, to become reality.
In order to arrive at a decision that promotes the public order of
human dignity, Professor McDougal recommends the fulfillment of five
intellectual tasks. The first such task is to identify the social problem in
all its dimensions. In the context of the Latina/o condition, whether we
refer to the general problem of conscious or unconscious oppression, its
roots and manifestations, or to specific exclusionary or discriminatory
practices against members of the Latina/o community, we must
endeavor to gain as complete an understanding of the problem as possi-
ble and draw on all sources of knowledge available. These sources
include narrative 2 as well as traditional, trans-subjective analysis. It is
imperative that we use all the tools of empirical research at our disposal.
The second phase of the inquiry highlights the conflicting claims, the
claimants, their identifications, bases of power, and so forth. In a third
step, the approach identifies the particular solutions in the processes of
"making" and "applying" law that have been arrived at in the given
community via legislation, court decisions, and so on. Beyond the text
20. This is the way partial approaches, including ones relying solely on cost-benefit analysis
and other economic criteria, would proceed.
21. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959); W. Michael Reisman, A Theory
About Law from the Policy Perspective, in LAW AND POLICY 75, 88 et seq. (D. Weisstub ed.,
1976); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967).
22. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as
Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992); Mar J. Matsuda, supra note 4; see also
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,
45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (claiming the need for stories to be "typical").
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of these decisions, it is critical to also analyze the conditioning factors of
these authoritative and controlling decisions. Why did the law develop
the way it did? Those conditioning factors include environmental fac-
tors, such as the mood of the times, and the predispositions of the deci-
sionmakers, personal, political, social, and so on. Taking into account
changes in these conditioning factors, we would proceed to predict
future decisions regarding the social problem under investigation. The
last phase, which often is neglected in critical legal studies, is to offer a
recommendation to solve the problem at hand.
For this recommendation, we need a guiding light. Professor
McDougal's genius called this guiding light, the overarching policy
preference, a "public order of human dignity."23 This structural concept
of dignity has been defined as maximum access of all people to the
processes of shaping and sharing of all the values humans desire. Pro-
fessor McDougal's friend, Harold D. Lasswell, founder of policy sci-
ences, delineated those values empirically, as human aspirations for
power, wealth, well-being, affection, respect, rectitude, skills, and
enlightenment.24 In seeking access for all, not just Bentham's greatest
number, this approach would not leave minorities out in the cold.2 In
its inclusive thrust, this conception of dignity aspires to reach a solution,
as difficult as that may be, that takes into account and safeguards the
interests of all of the members of the community.
Documenting the face of oppression of Latinas/os in the United
States of America is beyond the scope of these few comments. A thor-
ough analysis of the problem, its conflicting claims and past trends in
decision, conditioning factors, and so forth, is nonetheless warranted.
Legitimate and widespread grievances exist. From the Miami perspec-
tive, it may appear that an increasingly isolationist Anglo 6 elite consid-
ers Latinas/os as the present major threat to the melting pot, the
constitutive myth of the United States. Famed historian Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr. has expressed this anxiety by stating that the unity of this coun-
23. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
24. Harold D. Lasswell is to be credited with the categorization of these values that are of
immense heuristic value. Cf HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM S. KAPLAN, POWER AND
SOCIETY (1950); Harold D. Lasswell & Allan D. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of
Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional Development, in COMPARATIVE THEORIES OF
SOCIAL CHANGE 12 et seq. (1966).
25. See Siegfried Wiessner, International Law in the 21" Century: Decisionmaking in
Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Settings, in INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 26 THESAURUS
ACROASIUM 129, 145 (1997).
26. The word "Anglo" is used in Miami to denote all non-Hispanic Whites who have lost
their traditional preeminence in local politics due to local demographics, i.e., a (mostly Cuban-
American) Hispanic voting population of more than 50% of all voters in the City of Miami.
(Vol. 53:831
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try is about to "break away at the fringes."27 In Miami and the
Southwest, where immigrant communities from south of the border dare
to refuse to speak English and establish their own social and economic
infrastructure, immigrant communities have made the inherited majority
begin to experience, ever so slightly, what it feels like to be different, on
the outside - to be a minority. Faced with what they perceive as Latina/o
insistence on non-assimilation, some Anglos, at times joined by African
Americans, have reacted with somewhat hysterical measures such as
English-only statutes and legislation that adversely affects the status of
immigrants on both the state and federal levels. Measures promoting
inclusion and diversity, such as affirmative action policies, have been
halted by the courts, which, at times, utilize legal arguments, such as
colorblindness, out of proper historical context. We should, neverthe-
less, avoid the temptation of throwing in the towel by abandoning the
legal process altogether and eschewing the reliance on claims to judi-
cially enforceable rights from the comfortable chairs of the academy.
Power, at least in the short term, is necessary not only to sustain but also
to overcome subordination.
II. LATCRIT AND THE ESSENTIAL RELEVANCY OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
If equal treatment, both in fact and in law, is our goal, it must be
universal and it must be reciprocal and mutually granted. We must con-
tinue to be mindful of discrimination within our midst. If we do not
respect the legitimate claims of others, we forfeit our own.28 It is fitting
that in this quest for equal dignity, the plight of indigenous peoples
within the Latina/o midst cannot be ignored. To their credit, major intel-
lectual leaders of the LatCrit movement have not done so. They have
formulated as international and border-crushing a theory as they come.
Elizabeth Iglesias has stated the issue clearly:
Making the international challenge in our scholarship confronts us
with the question whether our particular experiences of oppression
will inspire us to imagine a broader more inclusive community, based
on our common humanity and in solidarity with each other and the
struggles and suffering of our Third World "others," or whether these
experiences of oppression will become the media through which we
27. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DiSUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1993); see also THOMAS WEYR, HISPANIC U.S.A.: BREAKING THE
MELTING POT (1988).
28. See The Hon. Harry Lee Anstead, Legal Ethics and the Struggle of Native Americans, 9
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 5, 13 (1996) ("When we ignore the struggle of others, we forfeit our own
claims.").
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
stake our claim in the privileges of our First World citizenship.29
One must wonder whether everyone heard this message. A recent
"Annotated Bibliography of Latino and Latina Critical Theory" manages
to painstakingly describe seventeen distinct "themes" of "critical Latino/
a scholarship, ' 30 including "intersectionality," "black/brown tensions,"
and "Latina/o essentialism," yet fails to mention the indigenous condi-
tion as any such "theme" nor does it include it in the discussion of any
of these clusters of scholarship. The indigenous peoples of the Western
hemisphere are, however, a key ingredient of Latina/o identity. As Mar-
garet Montoya points out, "[A]s Latinas/os, we, like many colonized
peoples around the globe, are the biological descendants of both indige-
nous and European ancestors, as well as the intellectual progeny of
Western and indigenous thinkers and writers.'
The indigenous peoples of the Western hemisphere are of flesh and
blood. They have survived and continue to face an onslaught of massive
attacks directed at the core of their existence. Their plight is not merely
historical. It is a day-to-day occurrence of which we often are not
aware, or wrongfully believe it exists only in foreign countries.
Conscious, and even more often, unconscious racism may infect the
ranks of victim groups as well. I would like to share with you a personal
example that highlighted the problem for me. A friend was driving a car
in Miami, when a woman cut her off. Angry as hell and without even
taking a close look at the inconsiderate "stupid" female driver, my friend
blurted out "iEsa India!" Now, my friend is from Chile, a country
where very few Indians remain. My friend had never even met an indio,
or, for that matter, an india in her country. She also now regrets the
incident and has kindly agreed to have me share it with you. What it
reflects, however, is an attitude of unreflected, yet pervasive scorn of
native inhabitants of the hemisphere, which places indigenous peoples at
the bottom of the social ladder, and which appears widespread among
criollas/os not only in the Southern Cone, but throughout Latin
America. Similar attitudes, I am told, are to be found in Mexico, Vene-
zuela, and other parts of the Western hemisphere. They are a legacy of
history - a history of suffering, physical and cultural genocide, con-
quest, penetration, and marginalization that has been endured by indige-
nous people in this hemisphere and beyond.
Still, indigenous peoples have not been stamped out. A majority of
29. Elizabeth Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MiAMi
INTER-AM. L. REV. 177, 180 (1997).
30. Jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1509, 1511-14 (1997).
31. Margaret E. Montoya, supra note 5, at 40. LatCrit III has taken up the challenge and
made indigenous peoples a theme of the official discourse.
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the population of Bolivia and Guatemala are indios. The indigenous
people of Peru and Ecuador constitute more than forty percent of the
population. In twelve countries, including Belize, Honduras, Mexico,
and Chile, between five percent and twenty percent of the population are
considered indigenous.3" Overall, approximately fifty million people
maintain indigenous lifestyles. This population is growing in absolute
and relative numbers,33 despite continuing attempts at physical extermi-
nation, the mass killings that never stopped, the disappearances, and the
tortures. In civil wars, indigenous communities are often caught
between the government and its armed forces on the one hand, and pri-
vate armies or gangs on the other. Ethnocide was often committed
through the theft of indigenous land, policies of assimilation and termi-
nation, public and private discrimination, and other severe deprivations
of many kinds.34
It bears repeating that the process of colonization has left indige-
nous peoples defeated and relegated to minor spaces and reservations,
mere breadcrumbs of the land conceded by the dominant society. Indi-
ans were separated from the sacred land of their ancestors, with which
they shared a deeply spiritual bond. Deprived of traditional environ-
ments, they were politically, economically, culturally, and religiously
dispossessed. They became entrapped peoples, "nations within."35 The
indigenous peoples aspire to leave this confinement, to extricate them-
selves from the trap, and to live lives of self-defined dignity and happi-
ness. Indigenous peoples all over the world claim the right to live freely
on their ancestral lands, to celebrate their culture and deeply-felt spiritu-
ality, and to move from cultural autonomy to economic autonomy, and
to political self-government. At times they may even call for the ulti-
mate option of secession.
Despite the European powers' successes on the battlefield, the legal
systems of the conquerors often had a hard time justifying the conquest
in terms of the constitutive myths of the community. Catholic Spain had
Francisco de Vitoria rationalize the duty of the Indians to welcome the
Iberian "guests," inter alia, with the New Testament admonition to "love
thy Neighbor" and to be hospitable to strangers.36 His view of the
32. See HECTOR DfAz POLANCO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE QUEST FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION X (1997).
33. See id.
34. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (1992). Current information can be found on the Internet, in particular at the home pages
of Cultural Survival (http://www.cs.org/main.html) and the Center for World Indigenous Studies
(http://www.halcyon.com/FDWP/cwis.info.htm).
35. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
36. FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE lURE BELLI RELECTIONES, 152-53 (Classics of
1999l
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essential humanity of Indians and their natural rights, however, did not
fit with the atrocities committed by these self-invited guests. Victoria's
fellow Dominican, Bartolom6 de las Casas, argued for better treatment
of the beaten people.37
By contrast, the British colonization relied much less on brute force
and the destruction of indigenous political structures and society. Its
subjugation strategies largely included mechanisms of negotiation and
persuasion. 38 Nevertheless, like the Spanish, the hands of the British
government and those of its successor administrations have not been free
from blood.
III. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN LATIN AMERICA
The legacy of conquest and the meanderings of the legal status of
the subjugated, but resurgent, Indian nations are retraced in the follow-
ing selective overviews of pertinent domestic legal systems throughout
Latin America. Brazil's policies regarding indigenous peoples have set
International Law Series, J. Bate trans. 1917); cf ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 100-01 (1990).
37. BARTOLOM DE LAS CASAS, HISTORY OF THE INDIES: SELECTIONS (Andree Collard ed. and
trans., 1971); cf S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1996). The
Dominicans Francisco de Vitoria (died 1546) and Bartolom6 de las Casas (1474-1566) were
united in their rejection of Juan Ginds de Septilveda's (1490-1573) justification of the Spanish
conquest by a theory of "world domination by the Pope or the Emperor and the Aristotelian theory
of natural inequality among individuals and peoples." Instead, based on natural law theories of St.
Thomas Aquinas, they recognized the claims of indigenous communities to be regarded as
subjects of the law of nations with inalienable rights often infringed upon by the colonists. See
Antonio Truyol y Serra, History of the Law of Nations: Regional Developments: Latin America, in
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 231-32 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984); Glenn T.
Morris, In Support of the Right of Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples under International
Law, 29 GERMAN Y.B. hr'L L. 277, 280-88 (1986); see also Greg C. Marks, Indigenous Peoples
in International Law: The Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomi de las Casas, 13
AUSTRALIAN YB. INT'L L. I (1992).
The theory of Iberian conquest by papal grant goes back to the two bulls Inter Caetera,
issued by Pope Alexander VI in May of 1493. These edicts were designed to resolve the dispute
between Portugal and Castile over title to the territories in the New World. They not only
allocated exclusive powers to pursue missionary activities to both states, but they also drew an
imaginary north-south boundary line 100 leagues west of the Azores between their present and
future possessions in the New World. This line was amended in the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of
Tordesillas on June 6, 1494 to a line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. This secured
Spain's title to most of the Americas and guaranteed Portuguese control of the easternmost part of
South America, which is now Brazil. This agreement was extended to the Pacific Ocean in the
Treaty of Zaragoza on April 22, 1529. Id.
38. See Steven P. McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 229-44 (1993). See also Steven Paul McSloy,
"Because the Bible Tells Me So": Manifest Destiny and American Indians, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
37, 38 (1996). ("How were American Indian lands taken? The answer is not, as it turns out, by
military force. The wars, massacres, Geronimo and Sitting Bull - all that was really just cleanup.
The real conquest was on paper, on maps and in laws. What those maps showed and those laws
said was that Indians had been 'conquered' merely by being 'discovered"').
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important trends throughout Central and South America. Brazilian Indi-
ans, most of them inhabitants of the tropical rainforest of the Amazon,
numbered 1.1 million at the time of conquest. By 1970, their numbers
had dropped to 120,000. Now, the total Brazilian Indian population is
estimated at 250,000, divided into 200 tribes and speaking 170 lan-
guages.39 The Brazilian Indians do not enjoy any "inherent right" of
"self-government." They are considered to be "relatively incapacitated,"
legally minor under the guardianship of the Brazilian state and subject to
a special regime of tutelage.4"
The tutelage is exercised by FUNAI (National Indian Foundation),
the "Brazilian Bureau of Indian Affairs." The role of FUNAI is, pre-
sumably, to protect Indians' interests, but this protection has been car-
ried out in an exclusivist way under the guiding light of a national policy
of assimilation. 4' Indians could not own land legally or initiate legal
proceedings in their own right to defend their precarious rights of "pos-
session" and "usufruct" of lands. The old Brazilian Constitution postu-
lated: "The Union shall have the power to legislate upon . . .
incorporation of forest-dwelling aborigines into the national commu-
nity" with the goal of "integrating them, progressively and harmoni-
ously, in the national communion." Like the model of Venezuela, this
model of development has been considered to be paternalistic and
ethnocentric.42
Partly in reliance on Vitoria's naturalist theory of international
law,4 3 Brazil recognized the fight to primordial occupation of land.
Many of its other statutes, however, help undercut this advantageous
legal starting-point. The national government owns all minerals and
hydropower resources found within the country. Brazil also claims for-
39. See L. ROBERTO BARROSO, The Saga of Indigenous Peoples in Brazil: Constitution, Law
and Policies, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 645, 648 (1995)(referring to Darcy Ribeiro's estimate that
there were roughly 1.1 million Indians at the time of Portuguese arrival in Brazil, and using
demographics based on a 1993 estimate by the Centro Ecumenico de Documentaqao e Informaqao
(CEDI) for the present population figure of 250,000). In reference to the estimate of 120,000
Indians in 1970, see Marc Pallemaerts, Development, Conservation, and Indigenous Rights in
Brazil, 8 HUMAN RTS. Q. 374 (1986).
40. Estatuto do Indio [Statute of the Indian], Law No. 6.001, Dec. 19, 1973, cited in Barroso,
supra note 39, at 652. Interestingly, if an entire indigenous community has "demonstrated its
integration into the national community," the President may, upon request of its members, declare
its "emancipation." Individual Indians who fulfill the same criterion, may also request their
emancipation before a court. See id. at 653.
41. See Pallemaerts, supra note 39, at 655-56; Cameiro da Cunha, Aboriginal Rights in
Brazil, 2 L. & ANTHROPOLOGY 55 (1987). Today, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 confers
upon the Public Ministry and its head, the Procurator-General, the function of defending the legal
rights and interests of Indians in court. Constituiqao Federal art. 232. See also Barroso, supra
note 39, at 655-56.
42. See Pallemaerts, supra note 39, at 380.
43. See discussion supra notes 36-37.
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est areas to be vacant land owned by the government. Thus, for forest-
dwellers" to have their rights recognized, they must seek recognition of
their title from a government agency that is also in charge of economic
development. Additionally, land reform measures, such as land grants
to individuals, threaten the lands indigenous people hold communally.
The new Brazilian Constitution of 1988, prompted, in relevant part,
by a 1985 communication from the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, reduces the role of FUNAI. Interventions on Indian land
no longer can be authorized by the Executive Branch; they require
approval by Congress. Also, the Indians' rights to their cultures and
languages, as well as access to the judicial system and their original
rights to land, finally have been recognized.45 Art. 231 provides:
(1) Lands traditionally occupied by Indians are those inhabited by
them permanently; those used for their productive activities; those
indispensable for the preservation of the environmental resources
necessary for their well-being; and those lands necessary for their
physical and cultural reproduction, according to their uses, customs
and traditions.
(2) Indians are entitled to the permanent ownership of the lands tra-
ditionally occupied by them including the exclusive fruition or enjoy-
ment of existing soil resources, rivers and lakes.
The Yanomami are the largest indigenous nation in the Amazon.46
Nine-thousand of them live in the Brazilian state of Roraima, while
twelve-thousand live across the border in Venezuela. The Yanomami
occupy a territory the size of Washington State, and lived undisturbed in
relative isolation until the 1980s. As many indigenous peoples, they
believe that the natural and spiritual world are a unified force.47 Their
peaceful life ended in the late 1980s when gold, diamonds, and tin were
discovered in their territory. Between 40,000 and 80,000 miners poured
in, killing, burning their homes and the forest, and bearing the "gifts" of
44. "Forest-dweller" is a term used co-extensively with the word "Indian" in the Statute of the
Indian, arts. 1, 3. See Barroso, supra note 39, at 654; see also Comment, Land and the Forest-
Dwelling South-American Indian: The Role of National Law, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 759 (1978).
45. See Indian Rights in the New Brazilian Constitution, 13(1) CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 6
(1989); M,.rcio Santilli, Notes on the Constitutional Rights of the Brazilian Indians, 13(1)
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 13 (1989).
46. AMAZONAS. MODERNIDAD EN TRADICION (Antonio Carrillo and Miguel A. Perera eds.,
1995) provides a good overview of indigenous issues in the Amazon within the policy context of
sustainable development. As to the demographics and institutions of the Yanomami, see Marcus
Colchester, Sustentabilidad y Toma de Decisiones en el Amazonas Venezolano: Los Yanomamis
en la Reserva de la Biosfera del Alto-Orinoco-Casiquiare, in AMAZONAS, at 141, 149-60; see also
N. CHAGNON, YANOMAMO, THE FIERCE PEOPLE (4th ed. 1994).
47. Cf. K.I. Taylor, Body and Spirit Among the Sanumd (Yanomama) of North Brazil, in
SPIRITS, SHAMANS AND STARS: PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH AMERICA (David L. Browman &
Ronald A. Schwarz eds., 1979).
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epidemic diseases and environmental and moral destruction.48
The new federal policy heralded by the 1988 Constitution was sup-
posed to stem this tide. According to this policy, ten percent of Brazil's
territory was slated for demarcation as Indian land. An October 1993
deadline for demarcating these Indian lands has come and gone. FUNAI
President, Sydney Possuelo, began a serious effort to protect these indig-
enous peoples from economic interests encroaching on their habitat, in
particular, gold-mining interests.4 9 He was dismissed in May 1993.
Brazil's turbulent internal politics did not help the plight of the
Yanomami. In May of 1992, President Collor de Mello signed a decree
ordering the demarcation of 9.66 million hectares of Yanomami terri-
tory." FUNAI and the Federal Police began to expel the invading min-
ers, reducing their number to approximately 300 in July 1992. In
December of 1992, President Collor was impeached, and government
vigilance ended. In the spring of 1993, the miners returned, numbering
approximately 11,000. After being driven out of their life-sustaining
environment, some desperate Yanomami are committing the first known
suicides in Yanomami history. 1
The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso has, lamentably,
given into some of the pressures of powerful groups opposed to the new
federal policy on Indian lands. Its Decree No. 1775 of January 8, 1996,
was liable to stop, if not roll back, demarcation of Indian land. It
afforded private interests the right to formally contest the boundaries of
Indian lands not yet demarcated. Decree No. 22 of 1991 had ensured the
primacy of indigenous rights to ancestral lands based on aboriginal
habitation alone. Under the decree, parties with "secondary" title would
be compensated for their losses. Decree No. 1775 is a response to a
48. See Catherine Alas, Tierras Sagradas, Territorios Amenazados: Los Yanomamis Mds
Alld de su Doble, in AMAZONAS, supra note 46, at 205, 207.
49. According to Professor Barroso, Sidney Possuelo "played a decisive role in the
demarcation of the Yanomami reserve." The then FUNAI President defined his position once as
follows: "[W]e caused so much confusion to the Indians that have been contacted and every time
we approach isolated Indians we bring so much trouble and so many changes to their style of life,
by creating needs, introducing diseases, that they only lose with such contacts. We should keep
away from them for as long as possible," Barroso, supra note 39, at 663-64 (interview with Sidney
Possuelo).
50. Barroso, supra note 39, at 662 n.62 (citing Decree No. 25, May 25, 1992).
51. Interview with Professor Gail Goodwin-Gomez, visitor to the Amazon Indians for the last
twenty years (Jan. 10, 1996). Professor Goodwin-Gomez stated that the health situation of the
Yanomami has never been worse. The Indians decry the "devastating effects of continued
invasion by gold miners who pollute the rivers and forests, and introduce disease. Since 1987,
nearly twenty-five percent of the Yanomami population has been wiped out by contagions carried
by the unwanted colonists." See Rainforest Action Network, dated Jan. 25, 1996,
<http:www.igc.apc.org/ran/info-ce... press release/brazilreverses.html>; see also Yanomami in
Peril, Interview with Davi Kopenawa Yanomami, 13(9) MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Sept. 1992)
reprinted at <http://www.halcyon.com/pub/FWDP/Ameficas/yanomami.txt>.
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Brazilian Supreme Court case brought by an agribusiness firm that occu-
pies the land of the Guarani Indians. This firm has argued that the
demarcation and registration of Indian land is unconstitutional because it
does not provide for adversarial process.
52
At the time Decree No. 1775 was passed, only 210 of the 554
indigenous areas slated to be demarcated, registered, and guaranteed by
October 5, 1993, were fully registered. The new decree was argued to
cast a legal cloud over the remaining 344 territories, even exposing pre-
sidentially-approved and demarcated areas to legal challenge, 53 includ-
ing the gold-rich lands of the Yanomami.
Injunctions to reverse indigenous land titles already have been filed
by powerful commercial interests. In addition, the effects of Decree No.
1775 extend far beyond the courtroom. In the first few weeks after
Decree No. 1775 became law, eight Indian territories were reported to
have been invaded, primarily by pirate mahogany loggers and gold min-
ers.54 The degree has been called a "recipe for tragedy" because it has
served only to encourage illegal invasions, massacres, selective killings,
abductions, and other serious assaults on the original inhabitants and
guardians of the Amazon.55 Still, by February, 1999, 315 indigenous
areas have now been demarcated and registered. These areas cover
738,344 square kilometers, i.e. 79.4% of all Indian lands. The Brazilian
government claims that Decree No. 1775 has given these Indian titles
heightened legal protection and has made the process more
52. Genocide Decree Attacks Indian Rights, Rainforest Action Network, Action Alert 118
(March 1996) <http://www.igc.apc.org/ran/info-center/aa/aal 18.html>.
53. Brazil: Amnesty International Fears for Indigenous Communities' Safety After Brazilian
Decree on Indigenous Lands (Jan. 24, 1996) <http://www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1996/AMR/
21900396. html> [hereinafter BRAZIL: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
54. Genocide Decree, supra note 52.
55. Amnesty International summarizes:
Since the decree was passed, on 8 January 1996, several new invasions of
indigenous lands have been reported. In the past, unscrupulous local politicians and
economic interests in many states, often backed by state authorities, have stimulated
the invasion of indigenous lands by settlers, miners and loggers, playing on
uncertainty about the demarcation process. This has resulted in violent clashes and
killings. The authorities at all levels have consistently failed to protect the
fundamental human rights of members of indigenous groups or bring those
responsible for such attacks to justice. Partial figures indicate that, during the last
five years, at least 123 members of indigenous groups have been murdered by
members of the non-indigenous population in land disputes. With few exceptions,
no-one [sic] has been brought to justice for such killings. For example, to date no-
one [sic] has been brought to trial for the massacre of 14 members of the Ticuna
tribe in Amazonas in 1988, and for the massacre of 14 members of the Yanomami
village of Haximu on the Brazil/enezuelan border in 1993.




Unlike 150 years ago in the United States, the possible replay of
"Manifest Destiny" in Brazil does not go unnoticed and unaddressed by
the world community.57 Indigenous peoples have found significant and
growing support worldwide - in the heartland and the capitals of the
once-conquering nations.
One comparatively bright spot is Colombia's current governmental
policy favoring Indian political and economic autonomy. The indige-
nous factor in this country is significant, encompassing approximately
800,000 persons, divided into eighty-one different communities and
scattered throughout twenty-seven of the thirty-two political subdivi-
sions of the state. The 1991 Constitution was drafted with significant
indigenous input and provided for a major political breakthrough. Arti-
cle 7 of the 1991 constitution recognizes and protects the ethnic and
cultural diversity of the Colombian nation. This is a marked departure
from integrationist or assimilationist schemes. It affords indigenous
communities a high degree of political and administrative autonomy
(arts. 246, 286, 321, 329). Respect for their institutions of self-govern-
ment is guaranteed through provisions such as those that recognize
indigenous courts and their application of traditional customary stan-
dards (arts. 246, 330). Indigenous collective property rights are recog-
nized, in particular collectively owned and inalienable resguardos (art.
329). Native languages and dialects are made official languages in
indigenous territories (art. 10). Education in these territories is to be
bilingual and must be directed to preserve and develop indigenous cul-
tural identity (art. 10, 68).
On a national level, the indigenous peoples are represented by at
least two senators in a special national district and by a number of repre-
56. See A Aqho do Governo Federal, FUNAI - Fundaqho Nacional do fndio na Internet
[FUNAI's official website] <http://www.funai.gov.br> (visited March, 7, 1999).
57. The world is on notice. See Action for Citizenship Committee, Roraima, Brazil: A Death
Warning, 13(4) CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 59 (1989). Earlier warnings have gone unheeded. In
1980, for example, the Fourth Russell Tribunal on the Rights of Indians in the Americas
concluded that the Yanomamis "face a high probability of genocide unless immediate protective
action is taken." See Shelly Kellman, The Yanomanis: Their Battle for Survival, 36 J. INT'L Am.
15, 36 (1982)(quoting Anthropological Resource Center, The Yanomami Indian Park: A Call for
Action (Boston, Mass. 1981) at vi). Beyond Cultural Survival, a good number of international and
domestic organizations are monitoring the situation in Brazil. Actions range from letter-writing
campaigns coordinated via the Internet, to the National Forum for the Defense of Indigenous
Rights' petitioning the Attorney General's office to challenge the constitutionality of Decree No.
775 in light of Article 231. See Brazil: Amnesty International, supra note 53. Additionally,
Members of the United States Congress wrote to the World Bank urging it to "insist that the
Brazilian Government comply with the original loan agreements and honor the demarcation of
indigenous lands." Congressional letter to World Bank re indigenous rights in Brazil (Apr. 15,
1996) <http:l/nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/9604/0109.html>.
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sentatives fixed by law. They participate in key decisions concerning
the exploitation of natural resources within their territories (art. 330) and
the drafting of the national plan (arts. 340, 341). Indigenous peoples
also receive transfers from the national budget and from the oil and min-
eral resources exploitation royalties (art. 357). The judicial system, in
particular, the newly-created Constitutional Court, using the innovative
writ of protection for human rights (accin de tutela,) was instrumental
in making this prescriptive scheme a reality.58 Still, there are
counterforces, including the "fog of war" with narcoterrorism, and
ONIC (Organizaci6n Nacional Indfgena de Colombia), founded in 1982
as the leading force of indigenous empowerment, has to continue its
strenuous efforts to protect the rights and interests of the first peoples of
Colombia.
Another place of cautious hope is Venezuela, at least at the federal
level of government. Article 77 of its Constitution of 1961 establishes
the principle of special protection for the indigenous peoples in order to
facilitate their inclusion in the life of the nation.59 Making use of this
rather oblique provision, the Venezuelan Supreme Court recently invali-
dated as unconstitutional the political structuring of the federal state of
Amazonas and ordered a reorganization that will take into account the
58. In the case of the Paso Ancho community, for example, the Constitutional Court has ruled
that there is a right to the creation of indigenous territories called resguardos, which are
constitutionally protected through the principle of ethnic and cultural diversity. T-118, May 12,
1993, Judgment by Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (mimeo), at 10, a holding reaffirmed in T-257/93,
Judgment by Alejandro Martinez. The Court, upon accidn de tutela by the indigenous community
of Cristianfa and to the surprise of a somewhat fatalistic nation, recognized a right to communal
integrity and stopped a highway construction project through indigenous land. T-428, June 24,
1992, Judgment by Ciro Angarita Bar6n, GACETA JUDICIAL, No., p. 479. Coal mining in the
border area to Venezuela, adversely affecting the Waydu community, was ordered to be
undertaken in a way so as to protect the indigenous peoples' right to life, physical integrity, and a
healthy environment. T-528, September 18, 1992, Judgment by Fabio Mar6n Diaz, GACETA
JUDICIAL, No., p. 363. In a case in which the entire tropical forest ecosystem was put at risk by
the activities of a wood production company, the Court upheld a lower court order for both the
wood company and the overseeing agency to pay the costs of an environmental impact study, as
well as reforestation and repairs. T-380, September 13, 1993, Judgment by Eduardo Cifuentes
Mufoz (mimeo). It stated expressly that the right to cultural integrity did not belong to the
members of the community but to the community as a whole. Other communities would not
benefit from this extension since their frame of mind was individualistic. See id. at 14-15. For
indigenous people, the Court said, the right to life includes a right to collective subsistence, and
the protection against individual forced disappearance includes a right to protection against
ethnocide. See id. at 23. On the other hand, individual indios did receive due process protection
against expulsion decisions by their community. T-254, May 30, 1994, Judgment by Eduardo
Cifuentes Mufioz (mimeo). For further insights, see FUERO INDfGENA COLOMBIANO (Roque
Roldan Ortega, et al. eds., 3rd. ed. 1994).
59. "La ley establecerd el r6gimen de excepci6n que requiera la protecci6n de las
comunidades de indfgenas y su incorporaci6n progresiva a la vida de la naci6n." Ren6 Kuppe,
The Indigenous Peoples of Venezuela and the National Law, 2 L. & ANTHROPOLOGY 113 (1987).
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legitimate interests of the indigenous communities in that state.6° On
December 10, 1997, the Supreme Court issued an order of execution on
that judgment. The Court ordered the Legislative Assembly of the State
of Amazonas to abstain from any action to give legal effect to its draft
law on the political-territorial restructuring of the State which was writ-
ten without the indigenous communities participating. Unfortunately,
the State Legislature, on December 17, 1997, decided to go ahead and to
publish the law despite the court's ruling. This action of defiance of the
Supreme Court order is now under attack in the very same court.6
Thirty-five to forty percent of the population of Ecuador is esti-
mated to be indigenous. The country's unity, forced by the ruling crio-
llo elite, was based on mestizaje, common religion, and language.62
Assimilationist and paternalistic policies characterized the policies of the
government. This resulted in efforts to "launder" the indigenous people
by underreporting their population,63 or by calling them "minorities."'
For the ten indigenous nationalities this exclusion is the reality, as rec-
ognized by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in its
April 24, 1997, report on the human rights situation in Ecuador.65 The
60. The decision announced by the Supreme Court in Case No. 748 on December 5, 1996,
declares unconstitutional, as violative of Article 77 of the Venezuelan Constitution, the Law
Regarding the Political-Territorial Division of the State of Amazonas. LA GACETA OFICIAL DEL
ESTADO AMAZONAS, ntimero 3, Extraordinaria del 24 de septiembre de 1994. Article 77, in the
interpretation given by the Court,
consagra un deber constitucional de protecci6n a la especificidad indfgena a las
variables hist6ricas ambientales, de ordenamiento territorial, de seguridad y defensa
y de la integraci6n del espacio amaz6nico, al derecho politico y representativo de
los pueblos y comunidades indfgenas.
Case No. 748 (1996). For an analysis of the critical parameters for such indigenous self-determi-
nation, see Miguel Plonczak, El potencial de la autogestidn para el desarrollo de las comunidades
indigenas organizadas en el Edo. Amazonas, Venezuela, in AMAZONAS, supra note 46, at 127.
As to the general situation of indigenous peoples in Venezuela, which faces many challenges,
see PROGRAMA VENEZOLANO DE EDUCACI6N ACCI6N EN DERECHos HUMANOS (PROVEA),
SITUACION DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIOS DE VENEZUELA CON RESPETO A LA CONVENCI6N INTERNA-
CIONAL SOBRE LA ELIMINACION DE TODAS LAS FORMAS DE DISCRIMINACI6N RACIAL (1996);
NEMESIO MONTIEL FERNANDEZ, MOVIMIENTO INDfGENA DE VENEZUELA (1992).
61. See Oficina de Derechos Humanos Vicariato de Puerto Ayacucho & ORPIA, Acci6n
Urgente, Desacato de la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Amazonas (Venezuela) a la decisi6n de
la Corte Suprema de Justicia sobre la Divisi6n Politico Territorial, Junio de 1988 (on file with the
author).
62. See Francisco Lopez Bermudez, Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Case of
Ecuador, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 175, 186-87 (1997).
63. See id. at 187. The author refers to the country's official statistics on indigenous people,
as reported to the United Nations agencies. These statistics fluctuated widely, from 50% in 1976
to 18.5% in 1985. See id. at 187-88. The 35-40% estimate is from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Ibid.
64. See Jennifer E. Brady, The Huaorani Tribe of Ecuador: A Study in Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 291 (1994).
65. See Bermudez, supra note 62, at 195.
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indigenous nationalities are shockingly poor, but they no longer are for-
gotten. They have managed to maintain their identity. Organized on a
national level in the Confederation of Indian Nationalities of Ecuador
(CONAIE), established in 1986, the indigenous peoples are pressing the
interrelated demands of pluri-nationality, territoriality, and self-
determination.66
Most of Peru's indigenous people reside in its Highland Andean
regions. They speak predominantly Quechua or Aymara and number
approximately nine million, which equals thirty-eight percent of the
country's population. 67 They are the poorest, least educated, and least
influential groups in Peru. 68 Historically, the Spanish, in the 1600s, rec-
ognized the pre-colonial social units of the Indians of the Andes called
ayllus.69 The Peravian government, in 1854, renounced this scheme and
sold many indigenous lands. The Peruvian constitutions of 1920, 1933,
and 1980 again protected communal lands. In 1925, fifty-nine indige-
nous communities were recognized. This number has increased, and
these communities have been granted a large measure of internal
autonomy.7 °
Bolivia, judging by percentages of population, is the most indige-
nous of all the countries in Latin America. 4.440 million indigenous
people, most of them speaking Quethua and Aymara, live in the alti-
piano, or Andean region of the country. They constitute fifty-five per-
cent of all Bolivians. 7 The indios are highly discriminated against. Via
a 19th-century decree, they were forced to sell their traditional commu-
nal lands.72 In the 1960s, an indigenous movement started, taking its
name and inspiration from the legendary Indian leader Tupac Katari who
had led the 1781 uprising against the Spanish colonizers. The Kataristas
were quite successful politically in the 1970s, and one of their leaders,
Carlos Palenque, an Aymara Indian, was elected Mayor of La Paz in
1989. In 1991, a national law was passed protecting the rights of indige-
nous peoples. On May 13, 1992, President Paz Zamora granted the
66. See id. at 190-93.
67. Pamela Burke, Highland Indigenous People of Peru, dated August 14, 1995, at <http://
www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/hindpreu.htm>.
68. Donna Macisaac, Peru, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA. AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 165, 169 (George Psacharopoulos & Harry Anthony Patrinos eds., 1994).
69. Cf Charles Lacombe, To Heal Society, Follow the Path of the Enlightened Inca, MIAMI
HERALD, March 14, 1992, at 21A.
70. Burke, supra note 67.
71. Pamela Burke, Highland Indigenous People of Bolivia, dated August 14, 1995, at <http://
www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/hindbol.htm>.
72. Consejo Indio de Sud America, Intervenci6n sobre el Punto 4: Declaraciones Generales,




indigenous people in the Andean region one million hectares of land.73
A constitutional reform in 1994 designated Bolivia a "multiethnic,
pluricultural society" and allowed indigenous people to assume the own-
ership of their traditional lands.74 Despite this progress on the political
front, social discrimination and economic distress are likely to persist,
since Bolivia is the Western Hemisphere's poorest country - second only
to Haiti.75 In contrast, Bolivia's neighbor to the South, Chile, reports, as
of 1995, only 598,000 indigenous people, making up four point two per-
cent of the population.76 The largest group of them, comprising over
570,000 persons, is the Mapuche.77 They constitute the poorest sector of
Chilean society, living now primarily on reservations south of Santiago.
On the basis of two thousand meetings with indigenous communities
and the work of a Special Commission of Indigenous Peoples (CEPI),
Chile has passed new legislation in October of 1993 that legally recog-
nizes indigenous peoples and their rights to self-identification, to their
culture, and to the lands they historically occupied and possessed.78
This Ley Indtgena also affords protection for sacred sites and establishes
a special fund (Fondo de Tierras y Aguas) for the financing of mecha-
nisms to resolve disputes over land and water. Additional funding exists
for indigenous development (Fondo de Desarrollo Indigena).79
Nicaragua's Political Constitution, adopted by the Sandinista gov-
ernment8" in the mid-1980s, recognized the communal property and cul-
tural rights of the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast.8 '
Legislation in 1987 also created autonomous political regions for the
indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast.82 Still, problems persist.
73. Burke, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Latin America and the Caribbean, available at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/
tablela.htm> (visited Nov. 25, 1998).
77. On the history of the Mapuche who had successfully fought off attempts by the Incas and
the Spanish to conquer them, see Jose BENGOA, HISTORIA DEL PUEBLO MAPUCHE (1985).
78. See Ley Indfgena. Establece normas sobre protecci6n, fomento y desarrollo de los
indfgenas y crea La Corporaci6n Nacional de Desarrollo Indigena. Ley No. 19.253 (5 de octubre
1993).
79. See id. at arts. 21 and 13.
80. See generally John N. Burnstein, Ethnic Minorities and the Sandinist Government, 39 J.
INT'L A . 155 (1982).
81. See Pol. Const. of Nicaragua arts. 89, 180 (amended 1995).
82. Statute of Autonomy for the Atlantic Coast Regions of Nicaragua, Law No. 28, Sept. 7,
1987, 238 LA GACETA 2833 (1987), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY
RIGrrS 386 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993). It should be noted that until the 1950s, the "de facto
autonomy of the Atlantic Coast," a former British protectorate and kingdom of the Misquitfa, was
"never explicitly challenged by the Nicaraguan State." STUDY ON TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND
OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN STATES AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS: THIRD
PROGRESS REPORT, Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1996/
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The Nicaraguan government's thirty-year concession to a Korean-owned
company to log a large area of tropical rain forest in the Atlantic Coast
region inhabited by indigenous communities is presently under attack
before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.83
Violence, unfortunately, begets violence when the two worlds col-
lide and little effort is undertaken to accommodate the vital interests of
the indigenous peoples. This violence has been the reality in, among
other places, the decades-long war in Guatemala, and the revolt in Chia-
pas, Mexico.
In Guatemala, on December 29, 1996, "the guns may have finally
fallen silent." The peace accord signed on that day between the govern-
ment and the guerrilleros, many of them Maya Indians, proclaimed to
put an end to this country's long, bloody, and "forgotten" civil war,
which left at least 100,000 persons dead, 40,000 missing, 250,000 chil-
dren orphaned, and more than one million people driven from their
homes.84 The final accords guarantee, inter alia, Indian rights and land
reform.85 The jury is still out on the ultimate success of this experiment
in national reconciliation.
Mexico is the battleground where it appears that indigenous peoples
recently have taken up arms against the ruling elites. 85 percent of the
Mexican population is mestizo, while ten million Mexicans are consid-
ered indios, primarily because of their language.86 These indigenous
23 (1996), para. 124. For details on Nicaragua's autonomous regions, see HPCTOR DIAZ
POLANCO, supra note 32, at 119-25.
83. See S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 157 (1996); see also Julia Preston, It's Indians vs. Loggers in Nicaragua, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1996, at A8 ("The underlying issue is the future of woodlands throughout Central
America, which are being razed at a rate of 1160 square miles each year.") In June of 1998, the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights decided to file a complaint with the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights against the government of Nicaragua, charging it with a violation of
Awas Tingni's traditional rights to their land. Indian Rights Human Rights. THE INDIAN LAW
RESOURCE CENTER NEWSLETTER, Winter News 1999, vol. 6, No.1, at 1.
84. See Larry Rohter, "Hard Part" Ahead After Guatemala's 36-Year War, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 30, 1996.
85. The text of the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples between the
Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG),
signed at Mexico City on March 31, 1995, can be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/minugua/
paz7.html>. It obligates the Government, inter alia, to "give special protection to cooperative,
communal or collectively held lands," and "recognizes the right of indigenous and other
communities to maintain the system of administration of lands which they hold and which
historically belong to them." Part IV.F.3 of the Agreement. Moreover, "[r]ecognizing the
particularly vulnerable situation of the indigenous communities, which have historically been the
victims of land plundering, the Government undertakes to institute proceedings to settle the claims
to communal land formulated by the communities and to restore or pay compensation for those
lands." part IV. F.7 of the Agreement.
86. Cf Margarita Gonzalez de Pazos, The Chiapas Uprising and the Negotiating Process, 7
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peoples, divided into fifty-three different etnias, have suffered degrada-
tion and severe deprivation of values. The Indian past is "in many ways
glorified," but an enormous gap exists between the Mexican myth and
its "operational code."8 7 The movement embodied by the Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberacidn Nacional (EZLN), in the Mexican State of Chia-
pas, unites men and women from the Tojolobal, Tzeltal, Tzotzil, and
Chol communities, all with Mayan roots, in the desire to confront the
situation head-on. Since its inception, on January 1, 1994, the uprising
has had military, political, and spiritual dimensions, and it has garnered
considerable support, both inside and outside of Mexico.88 One year
earlier thousands of indios had died needlessly in that very state, they
had experienced "physical and spiritual hunger, lack of medical services,
and a century and a half of discrimination."8 9 Their reasons for revolt
and their demands were outlined in a document called the Declaraci6n
de la Selva Lacandona. The indios asked for autonomy, the democrati-
zation of the country's political life, the rule of law, and certain aspects
of social justice.9" Negotiations, which began with much hope, have
stalled, and the reaction to the uprising has become more violent. The
"first post-modern revolution" 91 faces a difficult road ahead.
Despite local variations, we may note some convergent, if not com-
mon trends in the domestic legal treatment of indigenous peoples
throughout Latin America:
Indian nations still occupy the bottom rung of the ladder of eco-
nomic and social status in the countries in which they reside. Their
physical and spiritual survival is threatened by outside encroachment -
private and, sometimes, public action.
A trend toward legal recognition of the special spiritual bond
between indigenous peoples and their land is, however, clearly discerni-
ble. This movement includes the demarcation and legal guarantee, if not
return, of lands of traditional indigenous use, and a recognition of Native
title to use the resources of nature in the traditional, communal ways
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 685 (1995), as updated in Mexico Since the Mayan Uprising: Government
and Zapatista Strategies, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 159 (1997).
87. Id. at 685 referring to Jose EMILIO ORDINEZ CIFUENTES ET AL., DERECHOS INDIGENAS EN
LA ACTUALIDAD (UNAM ed., 1994) and CARMELO VINAS MEY, EL RtGIMEN JURIDICO Y DE
RESPONSABILIDAD EN LA AMtRICA INDIANA (1993). For the difference between "myth" and
"operational code," see W. MICHAEL RmSMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979).
88. See HtCTOR DIAZ POLANCO, supra note 32, at 148-49.
89. See Margarita Gonzalez de Pazos, supra note 86, at 692.
90. See id. at 692-93. The social justice demands pertained primarily to demands for land,
housing, health care, labor and education. Id. Gonzalez de Pazos, supra note 86, at 159.
91. See Ana Carrigan, Chiapas: The First Post-Modern Revolution, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 71 (1995) (referring to the movement's professed aspiration not to take power for itself, but
to create a "democratic space" where differences between competing political visions can be
resolved).
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(hunting, fishing, etc.). Counterforces, though, have been mobilized,
and they have achieved some measure of success.
Nation-states rule out the option of political independence or a right
to secession to indigenous peoples in their territory. However, in some
countries, indigenous peoples are afforded an increasing range of auton-
omy. This recognition of self-rule, albeit limited, covers issues of mem-
bership, structures and processes of authority and control, as well as
manifestations of culture and spirituality.
The gains made by indigenous communities are probably too far
advanced and entrenched for the clock to be turned back to the policies
of assimilation and termination.
To cement these gains domestically, the development of interna-
tional prescriptions would help substantially. These prescriptions might
not only seal progress discernible in the common law countries of North
America and Oceania, but they also could provide the necessary sword
to fight for a proper regime of protection and empowerment of indige-
nous populations in Central and South America, as well as in the
remaining parts of the planet.
Both on the regional and universal level, declarations on the rights
and status of indigenous peoples are in the formative stage.92 Taken
together with widespread state practice, pertinent customary law has
emerged.93 Any international prescriptions regarding indigenous peo-
ples should be structured in such a way as to maximize for the intended
beneficiaries the access of shaping and sharing of all the values humans
desire.
V. CONCLUSION
LatCrit, in its quest for authenticity, equal dignity, and removal of
all vestiges of colonialism and oppression, is a most valuable ally in the
struggle of indigenous peoples. Indigenous persons encounter, some of
92. Cf. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in 9
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 212 (1996); Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, reprinted in 6 INT'L J. CULT. PROP. 364 (1997). For comment, see, e.g., Julian Burger,
The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
209 (1996); and Siegfried Wiessner, The Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 6 INT'L J. CULT. PROP. 356 (1997). In the limited field of international labor
law, an important treaty has been adopted: ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of June 27, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). Its
ratification by Latin American countries, including Mexico and Bolivia, brings nearly forty
percent of all Indians of the Americas under the protective shield of the Convention. See Russel
L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 45 n.51 (1994).
93. For details, see Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples. A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs.J. 57 (1999).
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the very same experiences Latinas/os face day in and day out in this
country: exclusion, invisibilization, discrimination, the perception and
reality of oppression. LatCrit has not shied away from addressing diffi-
cult issues. The movement continues to unfold and bring to light, the
variegated, often hidden and many times unconscious manifestations of
discrimination, racism, and social/economic subordination. The phe-
nomena of oppression and discrimination, however, transcend the bor-
ders of this country. Latina/o identity, in particular, is essentially and
radically, i.e., from its roots up, international. To be true to its guiding
lights, the movement cannot afford to ignore the complexities of the
inner structure of the Latina/o community/ies. It cannot foreswear the
analysis of the sometimes vast differentials of power, wealth, well-
being, and other values within its midst as well as the resulting patterns
of oppression and injustice - whether they manifest themselves in this
country, "homebred" or imported, or at the places of the Latina/o family
outside the United States, in the other countries of this hemisphere trau-
matized by the experience of colonial conquest. The plight of indige-
nous people is very much a part of the Latina/o condition.
Myres Smith McDougal has left us with a powerful set of tools to
advance the critical study of the human condition and its attendant con-
flicts and to develop solutions in the global common interest. Would
that we make use of his treasure trove of instruments, his inclusive, con-
figurative jurisprudence to join together in the quest for a world order
that responds to all of our aspirations and that celebrates difference as
fervently as it affirms the universal goal of respect for equal dignity and
justice for all.
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